Graduate Courses

This is a beginning to intermediate level graduate seminar in ancient philosophy, with emphasis on Plato and Aristotle, taken almost exclusively by students in the doctoral program, usually during their first or second year of residence. The exact contents of the course vary from one occasion to the next. 

 

Stephen Engstrom 

This course will seek to recover an understanding of practical reason that was developed over the course of a long tradition in practical philosophy, principally through the contributions of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant.  The primary text will be Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, but readings will also include selections from Kant’s other writings, from Aristotle’s ethics, and from recent literature relating to practical reason.  The main aim will be to understand the idea that reason has a practical application, which constitutes a capacity for a distinct type of knowledge, practical knowledge, whose object is the good.  Topics to be investigated include (on the epistemological side) reason and rational knowledge and the difference between theoretical and practical knowledge, and (on the psychological side) perception and desire, and feeling and action.  Some prior familiarity with Kant’s ethics and Aristotle’s ethics will be helpful, but will not be assumed. 

 

This is an intermediate to advanced graduate seminar in the philosophy of Heidegger, taken almost exclusively by students in the doctoral program, usually during their second or third year of residence.  The exact contents of the course vary from one occasion to the next. 

 

James Shaw In this course, we're going to try to gain a basic understanding of some important positions in contemporary philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics while developing a toolkit of useful concepts and some basic philosophical skills. We begin with a unit on reference using Naming and Necessity as a focal point. In the remainder of the course we cover a scattered set of topics in M&E broadly construed. 

 

Title: Measurement and Aggregation

We can measure quantities like mass and represent them with numbers. But why think that mass is the kind of thing that can be represented numerically? Where do the numbers come from? Measurement theory attempts to answer this fundamental question. We will learn basic tools from measurement theory and then apply them: Are well-being and belief the kind of thing that can be represented by numbers? How can we compare well-being across people? How can we aggregate people's preferences? Is there a good voting rule? We'll also apply these ideas to AI alignment, for example by exploring connections between alignment techniques like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and voting rules like the Borda count.

 

This seminar is an intensive and advanced introduction to some of the main themes and problems in philosophy of science including the nature of evidence, theory comparison, the theory-observation distinction, the meaning of theoretical terms, scientific explanation and scientific change. 

 

This course deals with selected special topics in the history of the philosophy of science. It is an intermediate to advanced graduate seminar, usually taken by students in the doctoral program. The exact contents of the course vary from one occasion to the next. 

 

After a review of the mathematical framework of quantum mechanics, this course will consider a number of philosophically rich results -- Bell-type theorems, contextuality, the PBR theorem -- and interpretational puzzles that stem from how measurement is treated in quantum mechanics. We may also cover the interpretational significance of less commonly covered topics such as the path integral formalism or geometric aspects of quantum theory.

 

A practicum approach to train tas and tfs wherein faculty and senior graduate students train the more junior tas on how to teach philosophy. This course has been approved as an alternative to FACDEV 2200 for philosophy graduate students. 

 

The purposes of this seminar (which has very successful counterparts at other top graduate programs in philosophy) are multifold. It gives students working on dissertation projects a community of others in the same boat. It provides them with feedback on work in progress, and practice presenting their work to an audience wider than their committee. (This is important for the impression they make on the job market.) Supposing that each student admitted to candidacy makes a seminar presentation each semester, it hastens time to completion by imposing interim deadlines on the road to a completed dissertation. The seminar gives students who have been comprehensively evaluated but not yet defended a prospectus examples of other students who have successfully negotiated the transition. 

 

Updated 3/92/26

 

Stoic Ethics

When we talk about Stoic ethics, we refer to a long stretch of ethical theorizing that goes from about 300 BCE through the 2nd century CE. While throughout this period some core theses remained basically the same as those of the first scholarchs (Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus), it is reasonable to assume that they were spelled out in different ways in response to new philosophical concerns. In this seminar we will explore some of these core theses and we will try to track their development through time by examining the Stoics’ theory of action in light of their account of oikeiōsis (affinity or appropriation), the goal of life, and the so-called indifferents. We will go through these topics by using one text as our starting point, namely, Cicero, On Moral Ends, Books 3 and 4.

 

This course explores Spinoza’s metaphysics and its existential import. At face value, Spinoza’s metaphysical system represents a “worst-case” scenario: If Spinoza is right, free will is an illusion, there is no God who cares about us, and there is no inherent purpose of things or of life generally. And yet Spinoza insists that in this austere world of his, happiness and even blessedness is within reach. The overarching goal of this course is to understand how this can be - what it is for us to live and be well on Spinoza’s view. To that end, we will study major themes in Spinoza’s metaphysics starting from the early works to and through his magnum opus, the Ethics. Particular questions include: What is Spinoza's metaphysics of modes? What is the nature and place of human beings in Spinoza's monistic universe? Can finite things come to be from infinite things? What is the nature of freedom? How does Spinoza's answer to these questions evolve over the course of his philosophical career? What are the reasons for and significance of these transitions? 

 

 

This course explores moments when ethical life is shaken by demands or social conditions that feel incomprehensible, alien, or even hostile. What do such experiences reveal about freedom and responsibility? How should we respond when we lose our moral bearings?  In answering these questions, we will pay special attention to how disorientation, despair, and hope shape what it means to live and act well. Readings will be drawn from Søren Kierkegaard, Albert Camus, Simone de Beauvoir, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Jonathan Lear, among others. 

 

This is an introductory to intermediate level graduate seminar in metaphysics and epistemology. We will be exploring a selection of topics in metaphysics that are connected with one another, and which are central to metaphysics, including time, change, identity, personal identity, and persistence. The topics in epistemology that we will be discussing include ‘knowledge first’ approaches to epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, standpoint epistemology, perceptual knowledge, testimony, and belief revision.

 

A seminar on philosophical questions about Artificial Intelligence (AI). First, we look at arguments that AI could pose significant threats to humanity's future and even cause human extinction. Then, we discuss how to align AI with human values with focus on decision-theoretic approaches. We end by discussing the value of creativity, philosophy and "doing your own thinking" in a world of advanced AI capabilities. 

 

This is the first term of an introductory graduate course in mathematical logic.  Topics are completeness of proposition al logic and quantification theory and elementary set theory.

 

David Hilbert once described ``the question of relations between contentualness and formalism in mathematics and logic'' as among the most difficult epistemological problems with scientific significance. This seminar will take up that question directly. Our central text will be Juliette Kennedy’s Gödel, Tarski and the Lure of Natural Language: Logical Entanglement, Formalism Freeness, through which we will explore the epistemological advantages of formalization in mathematics and the phenomenon of formalism freeness. Along the way, we will consider questions such as: How does formalization contribute to knowledge acquisition? What is the meaning of mathematical language? What counts as a natural formal theory? And to what extent are formal systems adequate models of mathematical practice? We will reflect on the broader implications of these issues for the philosophy of mathematical practice, traditional philosophy of mathematics, and linguistic philosophy—both ideal and ordinary.

PHIL 2663 Models and Modeling in Science (Cross listed as HPS 2153) (32170) 

The use of models and modeling strategies in science is ubiquitous. There is, however, no generally accepted, or received view about the nature and role models play in scientific theorizing. Models are sometimes said to represent scientific targets of interest. How do they do this? Models are sometimes said to be explanatory of behaviors of targets of interest. How do they do this? Is the representative function of models related to their explanatory capabilities? If so, how? This course considers questions of these sorts, examining as well, the fact that models (almost by definition?) appear to involve idealizations of various kinds. What role do idealizations play in modeling contexts? Are they essential? Are they eliminable? . . .

 

In this course, we’ll attempt to trace some of the threads that Cheryl Misak has labeled as “Cambridge pragmaticism” (although by the 1940’s such affinities, had reached strongly through Oxfordian circles as well). We’ll begin with some of Charles Peirce’s early writings, working forward through William James, Frank Ramsey and Moritz Schlick. In this survey, we shall also rely heavily upon Frederick Waismann ‘s early report The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy in conjunction with the later essays published in his How I see Philosophy collection. As time permits, we shall read various adjacent authors such as L. Susan Stebbing, Rudolf Carnap, Heinrich Hertz, David Hilbert, Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin. We shall also consider whether any of these developments cast an illuminative light upon the exegetical mysteries of Wittgenstein’s middle term writings, although this specific topic will not represent our central focus in the course. The Misak volume shall serve as a central guidebook through this period.  

 

A practicum approach to train tas an tfs wherein faculty and senior graduate students train the more junior tas on how to teach philosophy.  This course has been approved as an alternative to FACDEV 2200 for philosophy graduate students.

 

 

Updated 1/9/2026

 

Three attempts at a definition of knowledge lead to deep issues in metaphysics and mind. “Knowledge is perception” inspires discussion of a metaphysical view combining Protagorean relativism and Heraclitean flux, on which it is guaranteed that perception never gets anything wrong. Finally a striking contrast is drawn between perception and thought. “Knowledge is true judgment” leads to questions about the possibility of false judgment, in particular how it is possible to judge that one thing is another; in the background is the question how thought relates to its objects. “Knowledge is true judgment with an account” leads to riddles about parts and wholes, elements and complexes, as well as consideration of the various sorts of thing that an account (logos) might be.

We will study the dialogue’s three sections in reverse order, starting with the last and shortest one. Students are asked to read it (i.e., from 201c8 until the end) before the first class. Readings, including the dialogue itself in Greek and in translation, will be available on the Canvas site. Knowledge of Greek is not expected, and the emphasis of the class will be philosophical (even if we occasionally linger over philological issues).

 

This course is intended to serve as a general introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, with a focus on its hylomorphic account of experience and knowledge.  Special attention will also be devoted to Kant’s understanding of logic, to the central role that this science plays within the Critique’s project of investigating the possibility of a science of metaphysics, and in particular to how logic underpins the systematic character of the critical philosophy, as exhibited in the derivation of the system of fundamental concepts of metaphysics (the categories) from logic’s system of forms of judgment.  As we proceed, we will examine relevant parts of Kant’s Logic and a few selections from other works, and some consideration will be given to historical context, contemporary significance, and recent interpretations, but the primary focus will be on the text of the Critique.  Prior familiarity with this work will be helpful, but is not required.

 

No course description available. 

 

This course examines a smattering of topics in the philosophy of mind centering around conscious experience and the knowledge of our minds from within. This will be done partly with the goal of trying to bring more contemporary literature into contact with the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose writings will be interspersed throughout the term. We may look at the literature on 'slow replacement' arguments for functionalism, on mental imagery, on first-person authoritative speech ('avowals'), and will more generally ruminate on what roles empirical research might or might not be able to play in a distinctively philosophical investigation of the mind.

 

No course description available. 

 

Seminar Topic: Free Riding
Free riders are objects of opprobrium in all times and places. They benefit from cooperative arrangements designed to produce important public goods, but do not do the part assigned to them by the arrangement. This creates a puzzle of great significance for moral and political philosophy: while any single individual’s non-participation may not harm the overall arrangement, and while free riding may actually do more good (for the individual, their family and friends, and even with respect to the public good in question), universal adoption of such reasoning could cause the entire system to collapse to the detriment of all. Moreover, free riders appear to benefit at the expense of others, making them seem like parasites or exploiters.

 

We will begin by examining the more general topic of “what if everyone did that?” reasoning in normative ethics, focusing on chapters 12–13 of Parfit’s On What Matters. A significant historical unit will address the problem as it figures in the thought of Hobbes and Hume, with particular attention to Hobbes’s "Foole" and Hume’s “sensible knave.” We will then turn to contemporary literature, reading authors such as Hart, Rawls, Arneson, Scanlon, and others on fairness and cooperation. Time permitting, we will also explore interdisciplinary approaches, including selections from Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action and Richard Tuck’s Free Riding.
 

This seminar will be devoted to understanding the subjective dimension of experience and its role in empirical thinking and reasoning. We’ll study a variety of views on this topic, including those of Coliva, Dickie, Gupta, Hill, Martin, Nagel, Soteriou, and Zahavi. 

The seminar is designed to prepare students to participate in the Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason conference (PEER 2025) to be held at Pitt from 12 to 14 December 2025. Details about the conference are available here: https://www.peer2025.com/. A part of the seminar will be devoted to studying papers that will be discussed at this conference. 

No course description available. 

 

 This advanced undergraduate course develops skills in formal and informal reasoning in predicate-quantifier logic, and covers formal semantics for sentential logic, informal semantics for predicate-quantifier logic, and elementary syntactic metatheory. We will also cover some topics in philosophical logic. 
 

This course will focus on central topics in general philosophy of science, including explanation, confirmation, causation, scientific realism, and the interaction between social and political values and scientific inquiry. We shall combine a reading of some historically important papers along with more recent work.

 

No course description available. 

 

Kate Stanton 

No course description available. 

 

Updated 8/21/2025

 

In this research seminar, we will engage in a close reading of Plato’s Phaedrus both as a self-contained whole (like an individual organism with its own internal principles of unity) and as a springboard for reflections on contemporary analyses of speech.

Commentators have long sought a single theme capable of unifying this apparently disjointed dialogue. Common proposals include: (1) erôs (which plays a central role in each of the three speeches that constitute the first part of the dialogue); (2) rhetoric (on which the second part is focused); and (3) psychagôgia or “soul-leading” (which seems to cover both erotic and rhetorical seduction). But logos is a more flexible candidate. The dialogue both features and examines multiple forms of it. We see a panoply of speech acts, from its opening greeting (“my dear [phile] Phaedrus”) and interrogatives (“whence and whither?”), through bribes, threats, and prayers, to its final injunction (“let’s go”). We see word spoken in play; myths and arguments (including elenctic refutation and Socrates’ “proof” of the immortality of soul); epideictic and other speeches (including Socrates’ famous Palinode); critical analysis of speeches and discussion of rhetoric (whether it is a technê and if so whether it can be learned from a manual). Dialectic, with its method of collection and division, is championed, along with spoken as distinct from written word. Many commentators have in fact turned Socrates’ infamous critique of writing against the Phaedrus itself. Why, given that critique, did Plato write it down?

This course will survey some prominent, contemporary ethical theories, focusing on close readings of Korsgaard, Scanlon, and Foot. We will also consider some papers by other philosophers that have generated lively contemporary discussions. 

 

 This course invites students to reimagine what political philosophy can be.  The course will be organized around four units, each of which will culminate in a zoom visit by a philosopher to discuss a work-in-progress or forthcoming paper. Each unit explores different ways in which more traditional questions and methodologies in political philosophy might be expanded, supplemented, or redirected. The first unit will focus on nudging (non-coercive interventions in choices).  This unit will feature a zoom visit by David Enoch to discuss a paper on how nudging relates to autonomy.  The second unit will focus on collective responses to climate change.  This unit will feature a zoom visit by Anna Stilz to discuss a paper on the relationship between collective self-determination and international authority in developing climate governance.  The third unit will focus on structural injustice and oppression.  This unit will feature a zoom visit by Sally Haslanger to discuss a paper on oppression and social ontology.  The fourth unit will focus on the place of emotions in civic life.  This unit will feature a zoom visit by Meena Krishnamurthy to discuss a paper on Martin Luther King Jr.’s views on the value and function of democratic disappointment.

 

PHIL 2420: Naming, Knowledge of Meaning, and Semantic Transparency
In this course we’ll work through a book manuscript that asks: “What does it take to know the
meaning of a word?” The manuscript explores this question through the lens of the thesis of Semantic Transparency—roughly, the claim that if you know the meanings of two words, you can tell if the meanings are the same or not. The manuscript makes a case that this principle served as a ground-level, uncontested organizing principle for semantic epistemology in the analytic tradition for decades, but that it was summarily abandoned in light of the ‘new theory of reference’ spurred on by the advent of semantic externalism and especially Saul Kripke’s work on names. It then makes the case that this abandonment was not forced, arguing that one can marry Kripke’s insights to a form of transparency. This is alleged to give rise to an overarching framework for language and thought that was overlooked in the analytic tradition. We’ll begin the course by reading Kripke's Naming and Necessity, trying to contextualize its contributions and chart some of its immediate aftermath. Then we’ll turn to the manuscript as it tries to diagnose the grounds for abandoning transparency in Kripke’s work, to carve out the logical space for retaining transparency, to develop the resulting ‘post-Kripkean’ transparency-theoretic framework, and to explore its applications.
 

No course description available. 

 

A graduate seminar on Goodman's "New Riddle of Induction" with special focus on probability. Questions discussed include: What, if anything, is wrong with predicting that the next emerald is likely grue after observing many grue emeralds? Are there objective constraints on priors? Should we assign higher probability to simpler theories? Do rational credences depend on our language? We'll read work by Carnap, Skyrms, Earman, Fitelson, Sider, Gómez Sánchez and others.

 

No course description available. 

 

Thomas Berry 

No course description available. 

 

No course description available. 

 

The topic of this course will be Aristotle's cosmology, focusing on the question of its likely development, philosophical significance, and critical reception in antiquity.
Reading knowledge of Ancient Greek is desirable but not necessarily required.